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SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY AS 
NORMATIVE SYSTEM 
Vihren BOUZOV 
ABSTRACT: Decision-theoretic approach and a nonlinguistic theory of norms are 
applied in the paper in an attempt to explain the nature of scientific rationality. It is 
considered as a normative system accepted by scientific community. When we say that 
certain action is rational, we express a speaker‟s acceptance of some norms concerning 
definite action. Scientists can choose according to epistemic utility or other rules and 
values, themselves with variable nature. Rationality can be identified with a decision to 
accept a norm. This type of decision cannot be reduced only to its linguistic formulation; 
it is an act of evolvement of normative regulation of human behavior. Norms are treated 
as decisions of a normative authority: a specific scientific community is the normative 
authority in science. These norms form a system and they are absolutely objective in the 
context of individual scientists. There exists an invariant core in all the norms of 
rationality, accounting for their being not being liable to change, as compared with the 
flexibility of legal norms. The acceptance of and abidance by these norms is of social 
importance – it affects community‟s aims. A norm only defines the common framework 
and principles of scientific problem-solving; its application is a matter of professional 
skills and creative approach to a particular problem. It is of no importance at all, if an 
agent‟s cognitive abilities do not live up to the requirements of a norm. Such discrepancy 
can be compensated for by the fact that a scientist carries out work in a conceptual and 
normative framework established by a respective scientific community. 
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1. On the Pluralism of Rationality 
In my view, it would not seem to be warrantable to take in science as a pattern of 
rationality, and to consider scientific activity as being more rational than other 
types of human activity, without a clear-cut understanding of the concept of 
rationality, scientific rationality in particular. On the other hand, its perceiving of 
as an abstract construction with dogmatic and restrictive characteristics – or as a 
wholly evaluative concept void of content – would have a serious grounding. 
There exists no agreement in the overwhelming majority of contemporary 
philosophers about the nature of scientific rationality and its traits. Obviously, it is 
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of major importance to find out positive solutions to problems of the nature of 
rationality in the context of the intellectual crisis holding sway, when criticism of 
science and irrationalism are in aggressive offensive and there is talk about 
„collapse‟ of scientism, scientific attitude, foundationalist programs in philosophy, 
and scientific or rationalistic perception of the world.1 Below I try to explain the 
nature of this issue by means of referring to the concepts of norm and decision. 
Scientific rationality is perceived by me – as a normative system accepted by a 
specific scientific community. An informal decision-theoretic approach is the 
methodological instrument of the analysis made by me.  
The concept of rationality relates to the instruments of carrying out human 
activity and defining suitability in terms of aims. The ideas of „rationality‟ and 
„rational-irrational‟ have a philosophical history of their own. Classical 
philosophical tradition draws a line of demarcation between rationality of 
thinking and rationality of action, between theory and practice. It is based on a 
response to the so-called problem of the genesis of knowledge: the main part in it 
is played by Reason via innate universal knowledge (the so-called „innate‟ ideas). It 
is a response of rationalism – the foundation of the so-called „modernistic project‟ 
of the Enlightment, which defines the universal laws of Reason, guiding nature, 
society, humans and knowledge.2 This type of rationality is selfsame for all people 
and is not dependent on time and social conditions. It characterizes the 
development of thinking, not that of reality. Rationality of thinking is an 
emanation of transcendental Reason. Typically, it is identified with the laws of 
logic and other „innate‟ truths. The rationality of an action is determined by 
aspects of: situation of choice, limited ability and knowledge of a given individual, 
and his free will. These aspects are rational, falling in with aims, and conducive to 
their realization. 
Another conception of the nature of rationality, featured below, is the 
methodological one: we can think of rationality of science as a definite set of 
characteristic features of a scientific method. The positivist and postpositivist 
philosophy of science identify rationality via a set of methodological rules. This 
conception of rationality presupposes evolvement and availability of a universal 
method and systematization of sciences. Scientific theories have to abide by 
certain rules and standards, themselves the gist of logical stringency. Rationality is 
                                 
1 Raimo Tuomela, “Science, Protoscience and Pseudoscience,” in Rational Changes in Science, 
eds. Joseph C. Pitt and Marcello Perra (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987), 93. 
2 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis. The Hidden Aggenda of Modernity (New York: The Free Press, 
1990). 
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guaranteed by means of abidance by such rules and standards, themselves an 
expression of procedures of acceptance, justification and criticism of knowledge. 
Their uniqueness and logical power determine the priority of science as regards 
other forms of knowledge. They are means of gaining objective, genuine 
knowledge; or of adequate explanation of phenomena. Their fathoming leads to 
the construction of rational models with claims on ability to reveal the nature of 
scientific knowledge and scientific change (Here I mean the models brought out 
by K. Popper, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, L. Laudan, P. Feyerabend and others). In this 
methodological context we can understand the definitive words of K. 
Ajdukiewicz, the prominent polish philosopher, who treats rational knowledge as 
“intersubjectively communicable and verifiable” by means of the use of objective 
methods.3 
Are scientists rational in terms of the „methodological conception of 
rationality”? L. Bergström is right in saying that it „confuses means and ends, or 
process and product, in a certain way”. Methodological rules could be perceived of 
as forwarding some of the aims of science, not as determining any particular 
behavior of individual scientists.4  
So far, the contemporary philosophy of science has not been successful in 
proving, convincingly, that rationality of scientific knowledge might be perceived 
of as one keeping up to rigid methodological rules. P. Feyerabend thinks that such 
type of rationality is a holdback in the feasible advance in science; it imposes 
limitations on human freedom. Scientific progress makes headway through 
breaking up the constraint of methodological rules.5 The hope that such general 
and all-embracing directives exist has been dwindling away all along, primarily 
due to the impact of the established pluralism of forms of rationality. Feyerabend 
convincingly points to the real variety of „rational‟ standards. The latter determine 
different cognitive strategies and practices. One might rightfully infer that the 
interpretation of a certain cognitive procedure or certain action as rational ones 
could not be pared down to a finite set of qualities and characteristic features. The 
concept of rationality is of a relative and changeable nature. There exists no idea 
(or activity, tradition) that might be assessed as „the one-and-only rational”, for 
                                 
3 Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Zagadnienia i kierunki filozofii. Teoria poznainia. Metafizyka 
(Problems and Theories of Philosophy. Theory of Knowledge. Metaphysics) (Diamonion, 2003), 
50 (in Polish). 
4 Lars Bergström, “Some Remarks Concerning Rationality in Science,” in Rationality in Science, 
ed. Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), 1-3. 
5 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline of One Anarchist Theory of Knowledge (London: 
Verso, 1975). 
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good. R. Rorty works out to an extreme relativism this entirely grounded 
conclusion of Feyerabend to an extreme relativism.6 This assertion is entirely 
unacceptable, because there exist also evaluative and normative invariants going 
to the making of rationality. 
At present, following pragmatist criticism – and on the basis of the use of 
the decision-theoretic approach – philosophy stipulates an elimination of the 
difference between thought and action, and between theory and practice. Thought 
is considered to be a type of practical activity, a singling out of alternative 
decisions. A subject‟s development is a process, the nature of which is determined 
by internal and external factors. We can say that the distinction made between 
methodological and practical rationality, between inferential and behaviorist 
conceptions of knowledge and reasoning, arises out of the unjustifiable „thought/ 
action opposition.‟ 
The decision theory is, as I see it, the most successful winner in the 
evolvement of a model of practical rationality. In terms of practice, rationality is a 
choice padded with good grounds.7 The theory of decision seeks to offer a 
plausible model of rational action and to formulate general principles of 
rationality, guiding decision-makers under conditions involving risk and 
unreliability of information. „The agent‟ has to make a choice in the presence of 
several alternatives: their results depend on the actual occurrence of a situation – 
reciprocally excluding each other in a set of situations. The agent will be striving 
to act in a way that might bring about a maximum meeting of his needs or 
preferences. A choice is rational if it maximizes an expected utility (usefulness) of 
a given action. This is the main principle of rationality in the theory of decision.  
There exists a shared agreement that the decision theory can be applied to 
the problem of scientific rationality, „hard problems‟ in particular, such as 
confirmation and justification8. A relatively successful methodological trend in the 
contemporary philosophy of science is developed on the basis of decision logic. 
One could speak about epistemic utility and about  choice of scientific hypotheses 
as an activity modeled by some rules of rational decision-making. However, this 
new methodological paradigm calls for existence of  a more convincing conceptual 
                                 
6 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 331. 
7 Frederic Shick, Making Choices. A Recasting of Decision Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 34. 
8 Ronald N. Giere, Understanding Scientific Reasoning, 4th edition (Orlando: Harcourt Brace 
College Publishers, 1997), Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian 
Approach (La Salle: Open Court, 1989). 
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justification based on the concepts of norm and normative systems as regards 
human action and its normative regulation.9 
2. Types of Rationality of Action 
It is true that all typologies of rationality of action are based on the making of a 
distinction between rationality of ends and rationality of means of aims 
realization. They might be defined as axiological and instrumental rationality. It is 
a characteristic feature of European thought that it interprets reality by means of 
the use of models in the context of the „means-ends‟ relationship, yet. Models are 
abstract conceptual structures representing the main characteristics of reality.  
Instrumental rationality can be termed as technological or economical one, 
too. We can consider it as a choice of means in the realization of a definite end 
through minimal effort. Their „ratio” is an yardstick of action effectiveness. 
Instrumental rationality encompasses the real essence of the capitalist organization 
of society and of its bureaucratic administration and economy. 
Instrumental rationality has different forms of manifestation. As regards 
organizations it functions as system rationality, featuring the need for of effective 
implementation of definite organizational objectives. It can also be defined as 
action rationality – in the context of practical situation of making a choice of 
alternatives.  
In his paper Rationality as a Value Klemens Szaniawski, another prominent 
Polish philosopher, emphasizes that rationality is a “fully rational value, which has 
positive or negative meaning as regards  respective aims.”10 Axiological rationality 
is determined by a choice of appropriate aims. The task of making formalization of 
the axiological content of a decision is very difficult. Choice of aims is determined 
by: value orientation, subjective preferences and empirical experience. The 
definition of an aim is an objective realization of thought. If one wants to fathom 
the process of discovery, formulation and realization of aims – he has to get to 
know the essence of a thought in its relationships to reality. Here one has to deal 
with scientific rationality – with scientists‟ search for realization of some scientific 
aims. 
                                 
9 Vihren Bouzov, “Scientific Rationality, Decision and Choice,” in Bulgarian Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 236, ed. Dimitri 
Ginev (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 17-29. 
10 Konstanty Junosza Szaniawski, “Racionalnosc jako wartosc” (“Rationality as a Value”), in O 
nauce, rozumowaniu i wartosciach (On Science, Reasoning and Values) (Warszawa: PWN, 
1994), 536-7 (in Polish). 
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The opposition between formal and cultural rationality is another aspect of 
our principal classification of rationality. Formal rationality presupposes 
availability of certain objective criteria and measures of choice-making, all of 
them with a quantitative expression (Example: an individual‟s choice of some 
marketed goods). Cultural rationality is determined by selection of aims: it has an 
evaluative basis rooting in cultural, social and individual experience. 
Referring to the use of old philosophical approaches, we can distinguish 
between subjective and objective rationality. Rationality, as an evaluation, 
expresses acceptance by a given evaluator of specific norms determining an agent‟s 
behavior.11 The evaluator can be an individual, a social group or a society (Here I 
mean also self-evaluation). The objective content of rationality spells out 
relationship between an action and a state of the world. The rationality of science 
itself has an objective aspect, too. 
Rationality can be considered as modality, as well.12 We can interpret the 
context of “A is rational” in this way. In such context, with variable A means 
beliefs interpreted as epistemic relationships to propositions. It can be applied to 
descriptions of actions. Rationality cannot be reduced to definition of truth. 
Referring to an analogy with the classical logical square, we can expand the area of 
possible rational evaluation of human action as follows (A is proposition or action-
description): 
 
                А is rational                  А is non-rational 
 
                    А is non-irrational                             А is irrational 
 
All relationships in the well-known logical square are intact – contraries are 
mutually-excluded, subcontraries are mutually-added, diagonal ones are in 
contradiction, subalterns propositions are in a relation of logical consequence - 
from general to particular. We can deduce “A is non-irrational” from “A is 
rational” and “A is irrational” from “A is non-rational.” Rationality is opposed to 
irrationality, non-rationality is opposed to non-irrationality. 
                                 
11 Bouzov, “Scientific Rationality”. 
12 Jan Wolensky, “Racionalnosc jako modalnosc” (“Rationality as Modality”), in W stronie logiki 
(From the Point o View of Logic) (Krakow: Aureus, 1996), 125-137 (in Polish). 
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This typology directs us to getting over contradiction between rationality 
and irrationality. An action can be non-rational, not irrational (for example:  
buying a present for a girlfriend). Scientific activities can be rational or non-
rational. 
3. Norms, Values, and Scientific Rationality 
When we say that a certain action is rational we do not express an assertion, be it 
true or false. This type of assertion has a definite comparative and evaluative 
element: we express a speaker‟s acceptance of some norms permitting or 
prohibiting the performance of an action. According to I. Levi, the requirements 
of coherence and consistency – the so-called “weak principles of rationality” – are 
“normative standards of rational health.” They “could be deployed by deliberating 
agents to evaluate their options, probability judgments and value judgments”; they 
should be applicable to self-criticism as well.13 Hence, it is an “action-guiding 
dimension” of rationality; in this sense the decision theory, as a normative theory, 
“provides normative criteria for assessing how decision problems are resolved.”14  
But „the external perspective” is of greater importance in rational 
evaluation. The decision theory can be a methodological tool in predicting or 
explaining human behavior. Norms themselves are decisions of a normative 
authority. The value judgment of a respective scientific community is external to 
an individual scientist. The external perspective of the application of rational 
normative standards is objective and is determined by social factors. Statements of 
rationality can be objective even if “the rational” is only valid for humans in 
specific contexts.15 Therefore, one can say that scientific rationality is a non-
stringent regulatory system. 
Norms are prescriptions for action, based on values and systems of 
preferences, yet, they are of an objective nature, too. They are introduced by 
performative utterances of the type of: “I state that A is obligatory (prohibited)”, 
thus expressing a decision of a certain normative authority. The formulation of 
norms bears on „the will,‟ but it is not devoid of rational grounds. A decision 
                                 
13 Isaac Levi, The Covenant of Reason. Rationality and the Commitments of Thought  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 24-6. 
14 José Luis Bermudés, Decision Theory and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
14. 
15 Hillary Putnam, “Pragmatyzm i wiedza pozanaukowa” (“Pragmatism and Extrascientific 
Knowledge”), in Pragmatyzm i filozofia Hilarego Putnama (Pragmatism and the Philosophy of 
Hilary Putnam), ed. Urszula M. Zeglen (Torun: UMK, 2001), 24-5 (in Polish). 
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cannot be reduced to its linguistic formulation only;  saying that it is an act of 
evolvement of normative regulation, a process of imposing an authoritative will, 
the result of which is a division of all possible actions into three, mutually-disjoint 
sets: obligatory, forbidden and indifferent. The decision to enact a norm and its 
acceptance by an addressee are actions. Norms are ordered pairs of the type of 
<OAi,Ki>, where OAiX, X is a set of initial obligations {OA1,….,OAm}, the 
variable Ai expresses actions, and for every WKi (the set of possible worlds), 
V(Ai,W)=1. In the context of logic, „normation‟ spells out choice of a normative 
function. It is a choice of a set of postulated possible worlds imposed on the real 
world (the normed Universe) as its deontic alternatives. Obligations and 
prohibitions, established in the real world, are realized therein.  
Normativity (and, in general, directivity) is viewed as a pragmatic, not as a 
semantic characteristics of utterance; it cannot be pared down to the concept of 
„truth in model.‟ Normative discourse is made up of deontic propositions and 
performatives – themselves of a propositional character. The conception of norms, 
developed above, includes some basic ideas of the so-called non-linguistic theory 
of norm, suggested by Jan Wolenski.16 I think that this theory does not give 
answers to important epistemological questions – it could only be instrumental in 
asking questions about verification and justification of norms.17  
The logic of norms can be bolstered up in a broader context of decision 
logic, which has a prescriptive force. As stated above, it is a normative theory in 
nature. The choice of a norm is a rational choice based on definite rules; they are 
not entirely formal ones, because they have a definite social content. On this basis, 
decision logic can be specified as an intensional logic of rational choice. Decision-
makers can conceptualize the situation in which their choice is made. It can be 
expressed by means of choosing a suitable norm, acceptable to a given community. 
A norm only defines the common framework and basic principles of 
scientific problem-solving. Normative decision is a choice called upon to 
substantiate aims of a normative authority. Scientific community is the authority 
in science. It enacts and guarantees the binding force of the norms of scientific 
rationality, on the basis of knowledge, empirical verification, tradition, general 
understanding of science and its aims, taking into account existing social factors 
and prescriptions. These norms are absolutely objective in the context of work 
                                 
16 Jan Wolenski, Z zagadnein analitycznej filozofii prawa (Some Problems of the Analytical 
Philosophy of Law) (Warszawa-Krakow: PWN, 1980), ch. III. (in Polish), Jan Wolenski, 
“Deontic Sentences, Possible Worlds and Norms,” Reports on Philosophy 6 (1982): 65-73.  
17 Vihren Bouzov, “Norms as Decisions,” ARHE, Casopis za filozofii  2 (2004): 113-7. 
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done by individual scientists or members of a scientific thought collective. Their 
violation dooms a scientist‟s research to failure. But this fact does not question the 
statute of norms. We can agree that scientific rationality is not “a code of 
directives, applied mechanically, but is a set of general directions with ethical 
value.”18 The acceptance of and abidance by these norms is of social importance – 
it affects community aims. The specific content of systems of rationality norms 
and their historical development is determined by different cognitive and social 
factors of variable nature. The norms of Aristotle science are different from the 
norms of modern science; they themselves are subject to change nowadays.  
Following suitable analogy with laws of nature, we can say that norms are 
relatively independent of normative decisions. An agent makes a decision to 
accept or reject rational norms, because such decisions are in chime with his own 
interpretation of science‟s aims and problems, and with the interpretation 
accepted by the scientific community he belongs to. The choice of a norm is 
determined by the interest taken in maximizing an expected „epistemic utility‟ (K. 
Hempel). It is important to emphasize that the interpretation of norms developed 
by me is not a form of theories of „norm conformity.‟19 A norm only defines the 
common framework and principles of scientific problem-solving; its application is 
a matter of professional skills and creative approach to a particular problem. It 
presents possible “good grounds” determining rational choice.20 One can say that it 
is not justifiable to compare the role of norms of scientific rationality and their 
collective acceptance with religious fate21 – they include requirements of criticism 
and free choice; and they are of importance in the creative process. 
It is of no importance at all, if an agent‟s cognitive abilities do not live up to 
the requirements of a norm. Such discrepancy can be compensated for by the fact 
that a scientist carries out work in a conceptual and normative framework 
established by a respective scientific community. There exists an invariant core in 
all the norms of rationality, accounting for their not being liable to change, as 
compared with the flexibility of legal norms. The requirements of empirical and 
theoretical justification of knowledge,22 critical attitude, explanatory and 
predictive force, can play such a role.  
                                 
18 Szaniawski, “Racionalnosc,” 536. 
19 Steven Hetcher, Norms in a Wired World  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4. 
20 Shick, Making Choices, 34. 
21 Wang Shan Bo, “The Link Between Scientific Rationality and Religious Rationality,” Journal 
of Dialectics of Nature 28, 4 (2006). 
22 Peter Maher, Betting on Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 25-30. 
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Such a core and the development of various systems of norms of scientific 
rationality (in the synchronic and diachronic aspects) might be a subject of 
another philosophical analysis.  
 
 
